

SACHETA METALS LTD

(GOVT. RECOGNISED EXPORT HOUSE)

MFRR & EXPORTER OF ALU & ST. STEEL KITCHENWARE CUTLERY & HOUSEWARE ITEMS
REGD. OFFICE: BLOCK NO. 33, SACHETA UDYOG NAGAR, VILLAGE MAHIYAL, TALOD, SABARKANTHA, PRANTIJ,
GUJARAT,383215
CORPO. OFF: SEJ PLAZA BLDG, 502/5TH FLOOR, MARVE ROAD, NEAR NUTAN SCHOOL, MALAD WEST, MUMBAI-
400064, MAHARASHTRA
TEL NO: 00 91 22 28725948 /
E-MAIL: sacheta@sacheta.com, WEB SITE: www.sacheta.com
CIN NO. L51100GJ1990PLC013784

Date:27.01.2026

To,
The Listing Department,
BSE Limited,
P.J. Towers, Dalal Street,
Mumbai-400001

Security Code: - 531869

Sub: Newspaper Publication of Unaudited financial results of the Company for the
quarter ended December 31, 2025.

Ref: Regulation 47(1) read with regulation 46(2)(q) of the SEBI (Listing Obligations
and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015.

Dear Sir/Madam,

We herewith enclose copies of newspaper advertisement regarding extract of the Unaudited standalone financial results of the Company for the quarter ended December 31, 2025, published in (1) Free Press Gujarat (English) and (2) Lok Mitra (Gujarati) dated 25th January, 2026.

This is for your information and record.

Thanking you,
Yours faithfully,

For Sacheta Metals Limited

Pranav S. Shah
Executive Director
DIN:06949685

Editorial

How Venezuela is a moment of reckoning for Global South



On 3 January 2026, the whole world stood shocked at the United States series of airstrikes on Venezuela. As claimed by President Donald Trump, the Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife have been captured by the American authorities under a 'narco-terrorism conspiracy', and Venezuela is under temporary American control until there is a "safe, proper and judicious transition". These claims have been rejected by the Venezuelan government and have not been verified independently, underscoring the unilateral nature of the US action.

The US attack, codenamed 'Operation Absolute Resolve', has brewed a fresh debate on the issues of regional intervention or a tactical move. For the Brics nations this incident marks the fragility of the international legal order, and for the rest of the world it also raises the question of the relevance of the United Nations as a forum for ensuring global peace and stability. Do international laws and commitments hold any truth, or is the world drifting towards the normalisation of legal double standards?

Is 'legitimate' also lawful? The UN Charter and numerous statutes of international law categorically prohibit states from attacking another country without provocation or only for self-defence. In an ideal situation, even for self-defence against an armed attack, the authorisation must be routed through the Security Council. But Operation Absolute Resolve satisfied neither of the legal thresholds which have been repeatedly affirmed by the International Court of Justice, even in the case of *Nicaragua v United States* (1986). The judgement in the case of *Nicaragua v United States* (1986) was a hallmark in protecting the post-colonial states from the intervention of the powerful states and establishing the most cherished ideal of sovereignty for all.

No matter how compelling the humanitarian rhetoric and the security narratives of President Trump and his supporters may sound, international law rejects it as any valid ground for aggression. The US has already witnessed the unnecessary cost of stretching security narratives during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Similarly, in many such cases, it has been amply made clear that the legitimacy claims on any basis do not translate illegality into law. The legality vs legitimacy conundrum was also highlighted even in one of the major landmark cases, involving Nato's intervention in Kosovo (1999), often defended as a humanitarian precedent; the international lawyers labelled it as "illegal but legitimate".

For small and emerging powers, especially in Brics, the recent American attack on Venezuela is more than just a moral abstraction; it's a legal rupture, a violation of an international order that systematically limits the great power hegemony. Unlike treaty-bound alliances consisting of major powers, Brics states have mostly relied on international law, multilateral institutions and diplomatic engagements, rather than on military

India needs sharp pragmatism in Myanmar as elections set stage for Junta

After almost four years of a coup, Myanmar has held elections, which, by definition, do not appear to be free and fair and were just held to legitimise the military rule. The most important aspect of this election is that the generals' consolidation of power could influence South Asia's stability and balance in the coming period, especially in India, at the centre of the region.

Until now, the strategic and security complexities of Myanmar have been quietly assessed, but post-elections, there will be a sense of dynamism, for which India must revisit its strategy to deal with Myanmar.

The Complex Tug of War

The Myanmar socio-political landscape has been dominated by a triangular contest among the civilian government, the military, and the rebels, where the pre-coup scenario suggests that the relationship between the civilian government and the army was governed by nationalist spirit and the establishment of a strong state, which was glaringly visible. When the Arakan Army (AA) attacked the police in 2019, Aung San Suu Kyi's government officially labelled them "terrorists" in 2020 and ordered the military to crush them.

While the military used the National Ceasefire Agreement to weaken rebels through a rule-based strategy, major rebel groups, the Arakan Army and the Kachin, refused to sign. By the November 2020 elections, the relationship between the civilian government (NLD) and the military had soured. The civilian government won a landslide victory, while the military-backed political party suffered defeat, threatening the military's grip on Myanmar's political system, which was guaranteed by the

2008 constitution through 25 per cent of seats and control of key ministries. Along with political reasons, the Myanmar military chief, Min Aung Hlaing, who was scheduled to retire almost six months after the 2020 elections, had his own ambition to rise in power, which further fuelled the drive to capture power through a coup.

The rebels' struggle for greater autonomy reached its peak after the coup, when all guns turned against the military. The Bamar nationalist population, the country's majority ethnic group, and the ethnic divide with the rebels dissolved, and the People's Defence Forces, comprising Bamar youth, were formed, backed by ethnic rebels. In this complex tug-of-war, the civilian government, aligned with the military, turned against it after the coup and, through a shadow government and its pro-democratic government, sided with the rebels.

India's Strategy With Generals and Generals

India's strategy for India-Myanmar affairs was simple—engage with pro-democratic forces, especially after its support for the 1988 pro-democratic uprising in Myanmar. However, during the 1990s, the Northeast faced an ethnic insurgency that pushed India to rethink its engagement with Myanmar. In 1993, India began to shift its engagement by opening diplomatic channels with the rebels.

From the late 90s to the early 2000s, especially under the Vajpayee government, the relationship began to develop constructively, with high-level visits, such as the Vice Chairman of the Junta, General Maung Aye's visit to India in 2000. By 2003, the Junta began sharing intelligence on the movements



of anti-India insurgents.

The relationship between the generals and Delhi further developed at strategic and economic levels when China began building a listening post on the Coco Islands to spy on India's DRDO missile tests in Odisha. India began to provide military and strategic aid to the Junta to create an alternative to the generals and prevent them from a full strategic embrace of China.

India's opening to generals primarily focused on security and strategic interests—first to counter insurgents and to check China's influence, which was widely perceived among generals and could become a tool in China's hands to disrupt India's eastern front. This logic of engagement with generals echoed India's expanding strategic interests in the east under the umbrella of the Look East policy at one end. However, on the other end, it created friction with the pro-democratic forces (NLD). When pro-junta mobs attacked Suu Kyi in the Depayin Massacre (2003), India's response was notably muted.

The Twin Track Era
In 2015, NLD won the first truly open general election. Suu Kyi became State Counsellor (de facto leader) and formed the government in Myanmar but remained restricted by the military from assuming the full presidency, as the military-drafted 2008

constitution barred individuals with foreign spouses or children from the presidency. Aung San Suu Kyi's late husband and two children are British nationals, making her ineligible for the presidency.

However, the State Counsellor post functioned in practice as a prime ministerial office, despite its de facto status. The civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi was responsible for education, the economy and foreign affairs, while the military was responsible for defence, home affairs and border security.

This dual arrangement realigned India's strategy into a twin-track approach, allowing it to balance relations with both the civilian government and the military. The core aspect of this strategy was the balance between socio-economic and strategic interests. The maintenance of cultural-economic ties with the civilian government to preserve India's political influence at the national level and to contain China's influence. Strategic balance with the Junta to ensure the strategic interests of reducing China's dependency and securing the security of the Northeast.

To some extent, India successfully pursued this twin-track diplomacy by expanding personal and cultural outreach through a development partnership with Aung San Suu Kyi, thereby reinforcing India's political influence in Myanmar, particularly with Aung San Suu Kyi.

On the other hand, India maintained its influence among generals and began cultivating deeper ties. India gifted a Kilo-class submarine (INS Sindhuvir, renamed UMS Minye Theinkhathu) to the Myanmar Navy, making it the first submarine for the Myanmar Navy. India continued to supply military aid in exchange for intelligence and to flush out anti-India insurgents, thereby presenting the military with a strategic alternative to China.

This strategic balancing act was put to the test in 2017 during the early phases of the Rohingya crisis. The West was criticising the government and military, further complicating the situation. Bangladesh was also in the centre of attention, as supporting military action against the Rohingya would most likely anger Bangladesh, which sees the crisis as a their own aspirations.

As for students, before they enter universities, there are many key changes that are emerging. For example, the Central Board of Secondary Education has decided to hold two rounds of the Class X exams — this will start in 2026. Several state boards have already implemented a similar scheme, notably West Bengal in its higher secondary curriculum. This may radically change the way university admissions are carried out in the future and the kind of subjects the students take up after school.

2025 was also the year the world came to India, and India went to the world with renewed confidence. The regulations allowing top-tier foreign universities to set up campuses on Indian soil are beginning to bear fruit, laying the seeds for an ecosystem of competition and collaboration. This is also about the internationalisation of Indian pedagogy as university curricula look far and wide to make their courses compatible with those elsewhere in the world. At Ashoka, and across the peer group of forward-looking institutions, we are seeing a surge in the notion of internationalisation at home.

India's strategic balancing approach gave equal weight to both sides. At one end, it did not directly and assertively condemn Myanmar and further abstained from a resolution that would sanction generals. On the other hand, it adopted a development approach, signing an agreement with Suu Kyi's government to construct prefabricated houses for returning refugees as part of Rakhine State's development. This kept India's political engagement with the government intact and eased the issue with Bangladesh.

This twin approach, combining strategic action with the Junta and political action with the de facto civilian government, kept India's long-term interests in Myanmar secure and functional.

Coup and Elections

After the coup in 2021, India's strategic balance faced a strong challenge from China, putting India's security and strategic interests in the Northeast at stake. China demonstrated full control of the situation at one end while providing a diplomatic shield at the UN through a veto on sanctions proposals. On the other hand, it played a strong role as a broker between the rebels and the junta. China's brokering of peace between the Three Brotherhood Alliance and the Junta after Operation 1027, when the Junta saw significant losses against the rebels, gave clear signals that China is controlling both the war and peace switches in Myanmar, which could threaten India's eastern frontier and make it vulnerable to external influence ever since the Manipur crisis.

In return for these diplomatic and security assurances, Myanmar's military accelerated mega China-Myanmar Economic Corridor projects and granted China access to the strategic Kyaukphyu Port, giving China direct access to the Indian Ocean by bypassing the Malacca Strait.

Until India's strategic balancing act could give equal weight to relations between the de facto government and the military, the power balance was right. Post-coup, this balance shifted, strengthening the junta and aligning it more closely with China as longstanding military relations deepened.

India was left with one option: to return to the Vajpayee-era approach and begin developing deeper ties with the Junta. But within a few years, as the Junta began losing significant ground to rebels, it became clear that India couldn't work in isolation or negotiate with one power; it had to open its twin-track diplomacy to include the rebels, as the stakes had risen. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project is India's gateway to

the Northeast via sea. The project is physically located in Rakhine State, now controlled by the Arakan Army.

The Manipur rebels also have traditional ties with other rebels, which have further complicated the security scenario and pushed India to rethink its approach to dealing with the Junta. The challenge is that negotiating with rebels might strain relations with the junta and push it closer to China, attracting Chinese attention as well.

A Sharp Pragmatism

India perhaps realises that negotiating with a single power in Myanmar is unlikely to work in India's favour. New Delhi has opened its backdoor channels—clandestine diplomacy through intelligence networks and political channels, including the Mizoram government leveraging ethnic linkages—to engage with rebels and ensure its strategic and security interests remain secure. On the other hand, silence on the Junta's actions and repatriating Junta soldiers who often flee into India when overruled by rebels.

The current approach suggests that India engage on a need basis—a fragmented balancing act with both actors, keeping their boats afloat in choppy waters. However, in the long run, it may not work as China's influence grows and India's bargaining power erodes. India needs a sharper balance, putting equal weight on both ends by assertively negotiating to maintain strong bargaining power.

Instead of a fragmented balance, it needs a sharper balance that can be leveraged through strong economic and logistical engagement with rebels to reduce their dependence on Chinese brokers who control them through weapons and trade supplies. For the Arakan Army, access to the Indian market via Mizoram is a strategic alternative to China and can further help India deepen its ties with rebels.

On the other hand, maintaining influence over the Junta through continued intelligence sharing on the Rohingya militants and providing hardware and military aid to the Junta. But as generals are likely to be legitimised soon through elections, India must prepare to strategically intervene with both actors—no political or strategic pragmatic balance is required.

Rather, sharper, more ruthless or risky pragmatic actions are required, where India not only has strong negotiating power but also strong bargaining power. Following the elections, China will further expand its influence in Myanmar, which could affect India's influence and regional security as well. India must have all its negotiating levers ready, even if it is through hard power.

SACHETA METALS LIMITED

CIN: L51100GJ1990PLC013784

Regd. Office : Block No. 33 Sacheta Udyog Nagar, Vill: Mahiyal, Tal: Talod,

Dist: Sabarkantha, Gujarat 383215

EXTRACT OF UNAUDITED FINANCIAL RESULTS FOR THE QUARTER ENDED 31ST DECEMBER, 2025 (Rs. In Crores)

SR. NO.	PARTICULARS	QUARTER ENDED	QUARTER ENDED	QUARTER ENDED	RESPONDING 3 MONTHS ENDED	YEAR ENDED
		31.12.2025	30.09.2025	31.12.2024	31.12.2025	31.03.2025
1	Total Income from Operations	21.39	21.11	25.68	63.27	91.91
2	Profit/ (Loss) for the period (before Tax, Exceptional and/or Extraordinary items)	1.02	0.68	0.90	2.23	2.82
3	Profit/ (Loss) for the period before Tax (after Exceptional and/or Extraordinary items)	1.02	0.68	0.90	2.23	2.82
4	Net Profit/ (Loss) for the period (before Tax, Exceptional and/or Extraordinary items)	0.77	0.50	0.67	1.67	2.10
5	Total Comprehensive Income for the period (Comprising Profit/ (Loss) for the period (after tax) and Other Comprehensive Income (after tax))	0.77	0.50	0.67	1.67	2.10
6	Equity Share Capital	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00	25.00
7	Reserves (excluding Revaluation Reserve as shown in the Balance sheet of previous year)	-	-	-	-	26.71
8	Earning Per Share (of Rs. 2/- each) (for continuing and discontinued operations): Basic : Diluted :	0.06 0.06	0.04 0.04	0.05 0.05	0.13 0.13	0.17 0.17

Note

- The above is an extract of unaudited financial results for the quarter ended 31st December, 2025. The financial results were reviewed and recommended by the Audit Committee and have been approved and taken on record by the Board of Directors at its meeting held on 24th January 2026.
- The figures of the last quarter are balancing figure between audited figures in respect of the full financial year and published year to date figures upto third quarter of the current financial year.
- The Statement has been prepared in accordance with Indian Accounting Standards ('Ind AS') prescribed under section 133 of the Companies Act, 2013 and in terms of Regulation 33 of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (SEBI Regulations).
- The Company is operating in single segment i.e. Aluminium products. The company has changed its object by addition of Real Estate Business activities in the main object in the EGM held on 16th May, 2024. However, there is no revenue from operation during the quarter ended December, 2025 from these sources. So segment reporting is not applicable to company.
- The Company has sub-divided its equity shares of face value of Rs. 10 each into equity shares of face value of Rs. 2 each, as approved by the shareholders at the AGM held on 28/09/2024. Earnings Per Share (EPS) for all periods presented has been restated in accordance with Ind AS 33 to give effect to the subdivision.
- Figures of the previous period/quarter have been regrouped wherever necessary.

Place: Talod
Date: 24-01-2026



For Sacheta Metals Ltd
Sd/-
Satishkumar K. Shah
Managing Director
DIN: 00237283

